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Introduction
The recent European debt crisis presented a uniquely challenging period for credit rating agencies (CRAs), triggering increased scrutiny of their relative performance. CRAs were partly blamed for the recent financial crisis and the subsequent effects on the global economy. This paper investigates the impact of the recently established regulatory regime for CRAs operating in Europe (see Section 2). We set out the key motivations and milestones in the regime overseen by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which was assigned with direct supervision of CRAs in the EU in July 2011. ESMA could play an important role in restoring the confidence of investors and market participants in the rating industry as well as enhancing financial stability. ESMA seeks to mitigate overreliance on credit ratings, hence reducing market reactions or overreactions to credit rating actions.
However, some aspects of the proposed and implemented regulations might lead to unintended consequences. The desire to reduce mechanistic market reactions is somewhat contradicted by the inherent process of endorsement and approval of CRAs.
The empirical investigation in the paper aims to establish whether there is any identifiable difference in market perceptions of CRA actions in Europe across a sample period encompassing the establishment of the new regulatory regime. The analysis considers multiple CRAs (S&P, Moody's and Fitch) in a competitive setting and studies differences in their rating opinions. We specifically investigate the impacts of bank rating actions by the largest three CRAs on European banks' stock returns and volatility during January 2008 to December 2013. We also examine whether there is any change in market reactions to rating news after the establishment of the new regulatory regime in July 2011.
Prior literature demonstrates that corporates' stock returns respond strongly to rating downgrades from Moody's and S&P, while reactions to rating upgrades are much more muted (e.g. Hand et al. 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001, Li et al., 2006; Behr and Güttler, 2008; Halek and Eckles, 2010) . Some recent studies investigate links between sovereign risk and domestic banks. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) find significant spillovers between bank and sovereign credit risk during the European debt crisis, providing evidence in favour of an asset holding channel and a collateral channel. Alsakka et al. (2014) show that sovereign rating actions have strong effects on bank rating downgrades in Europe during the recent crisis. Correa et al. (2014) find that sovereign rating downgrades (not upgrades) have a large significant impact on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger support from their governments.
The literature linked to bank ratings is relatively limited, and mainly focused on their determinants. Caporale et al. (2011) find that country-specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) affect EU countries' bank ratings. Shen et al. (2012) find that larger bank assets and higher sovereign credit ratings boost bank credit ratings. Hau et al. (2013) find that bank characteristics significantly affect bank rating quality assigned to banks in Europe and the United States by the three largest CRAs. Hau et al. (2013) also show that CRAs tend to assign higher ratings to large banks and those banks that provide CRAs with a large quantity of securities rating business.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior research which examines the effect of the establishment of a new regulatory regime (i.e. ESMA) on the market perceptions of credit rating actions. We also fill a clear void in the literature on the effect of bank rating actions on European banks' stock returns and volatility during the recent crisis. Our main findings are summarised as follows. The impact of rating downgrades on the abnormal returns and share prices volatility varies across CRAs. There is mixed evidence in this sample on whether the establishment of ESMA oversight has had its intended effect of reducing market impact of CRAs or promoted market stability. S&P and Moody's downgrades trigger stronger negative abnormal returns, while these effects did not exist before July 2011. The regulatory change has dampened the negative abnormal returns reported following bank rating downgrades by Fitch prior to July 2011. For share price volatility, we identify reductions following S&P downgrades. This effect did not exist before July 2011. Moody's rating downgrades trigger modest increases (decreases) in volatility after (before) July 2011, while Fitch rating downgrades have insignificant impact on banks' share price volatility.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the regulatory developments affecting the rating industry in Europe, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents the methodology, Section 5 analyses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Regulatory developments affecting the rating industry in Europe

'Reactive' phase of the EU Regulation of CRAs
Up until 2010, there was no direct EU legislation under which CRAs would fall. Selfregulation following the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
Code was an indirect form of supervision applied voluntarily by institutions (Johnson, 2004) .
The recent regulatory efforts concerning credit ratings originate from the US sub-prime crisis where CRAs were too permissive in rating structured finance products. The sub-prime crisis spread extensively to other financial sectors and shed light on the importance of ratings in the financial and economic stability (Alcubilla and Del Pozo, 2012) . The G-7 Ministers and the Central Banks Governors requested the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to study the origins of the turbulence and to advocate possible actions. This resulted in a report published in April 2008 (See Table 1 ).
During the G-20 summit in Washington 2008, member countries "aimed to ensure that no institution, product or market was left unregulated at EU and international levels" (European Commission (EC), 2013). Since there was no regulatory oversight of the CRAs in many jurisdictions, including Europe, this issue had to be tackled. The regime was shaped by international agreement with participation of the G-20, Financial Stability Board (FSB) and IOSCO (see Table 1 ). The EC classified the main deficiencies of CRAs into three main areas: failures in integrity, failures in reliability and lack of transparency. In December 2009, EC outlined a new set of laws involving CRAs within the European jurisdiction. The first aspect focuses on registration procedures which require that financial firms in the EU obtain ratings only from certified CRAs. Secondly, explicit rules aimed at reducing conflicts of interest were introduced. Sanctions include governance requirements, inspections of CRAs, increased transparency and enhancement of methodologies and ratings quality. 
'Implementation' phase of the EU Regulation of CRAs
Following the G-20 summit, the European Parliament and the Council formed EU regulation on CRAs (CRA I Regulation), valid from December 2010 (EC, 2011a) (See Table   1 ). This regulation was amended in May 2011 (CRA II) to respond to the creation of the European credit ratings' supervisory authority, named the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (EC, 2011b) . ESMA was assigned with the responsibility for certifying and overlooking actions of CRAs from July 2011. In November 2011, EC released a proposal to amend the existing CRA regulation, known as CRA III regulation (EC, 2011c ), as well as a proposal for a Directive on the use of external ratings by market participants (EC, 2011d) .
In January, the 2012 Executive Director of ESMA reported to the European Parliament on its progress of implementing revised regulation for CRAs (ESMA, 2012) .
According to the European Central Bank (ECB, 2012), regulations on CRAs were applied from a micro-prudential perspective and intended to restore the confidence of investors and market participants as well as enhance financial stability. The main actions were intended to (i) reduce excessive reliance on credit ratings, (ii) alleviate risks associated with spillover effects, (iii) develop a stronger rating market to improve the overall quality of rating practices, (iv) safeguard compensation systems for investors, and (v) strengthen the independence of CRAs and the soundness of rating processes and methodologies with a view to enhanced ratings quality.
The European Council and European Parliament released technical standards for CRAs in March 2012, followed by processes for enforcing fines and penalties on CRAs in July sovereign ratings were a primary focus, with the directive requiring sovereign rating actions to be published after the close of markets and at least one hour before they reopen (EC, 2012) . The legislation introduced a regime of civil liability which will enable an issuer to sue the CRA if proven to be a victim of misconduct or negligence of the agency (OJEU, 2012).
On 16 January 2013, European Parliament (2013) voted in favour of the new tougher CRA rules. CRAs are required to prepare yearly calendars with dates when unsolicited ratings will be released. Sovereign ratings are to be reviewed at least every six months. Dates of publishing outlooks, where relevant, are also required in advance. Moreover, issuers are to be informed about rating decisions 12 hours before they are made public. The EC is required to report to the Parliament by 1 July 2016 and reassess the state of affairs and propose modifications to regulatory proposals. One of the tasks recommended by ESMA involves reevaluation of the consequences of the "issuer pays" model. 
'Enhancement phase' of the EU Regulation of CRAs
ESMA's future plans concentrate on producing numerous technical reports to the EC in relation to the structured finance industry and its efforts to minimise references in laws and regulations to external ratings (ESMA, 2014a) . ESMA intends to enhance the existing collaboration with the IOSCO Committee and finalise amendments to the Code of Conduct for CRAs. There are proposals to form a European sovereign debt creditworthiness centre which requires ESMA's technical assistance.
Following the G-20 summit in 2013, the FSB urged regulators to speed up the process of reducing reliance on ratings in line with the agreements in October 2012 (see FSB, 2012) .
In order to accelerate this process, peer reviews aimed at helping national authorities in reaching objectives were conducted. This involves two phases: the initial stage recorded references to ratings made in laws and regulations across jurisdictions, published in a report in August 2013 (see FSB, 2013) . The second, ongoing, phase concentrates on the strategies applied by authorities to execute the FSB Principles expected by end of 2015 (progress was published FSB, 2014). It is reported that approaches differ across jurisdictions and financial sectors and the developments are often uneven. For instance, private agreements, collateral contracts and risk-prudential frameworks for intermediaries rely on external ratings. Further, the report discourages national authorities and market participants from applying measures substituting CRAs ratings as they might lead to procyclicality and herding among investors.
The attention was drawn especially to internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches for which reliability, comparability and transparency among others are questionable (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013).
In the current phase of the increasing regulatory oversight of the CRA industry, little is yet known about its effectiveness as it is an ongoing process. Certain proposals need to be carefully evaluated. For instance, the methodology requirements might pose a threat to the independence of the CRAs (ESMA, 2012 , EC, 2012 . Authorities themselves face difficulties such as technological improvements and choices between competition and stability in ratings needs to be made (ESMA, 2012) . The increased responsibilities and the criteria set by the Parliament do not go in hand with timing of the reforms and imposed deadlines, thus causing a considerable strain on ESMA's capabilities.
Data sample
We investigate the reactions of banks' stock returns and volatilities to bank rating Table 2 ). The daily share prices, national stock indices and other financial data of the sampled banks are retrieved from Data Stream.
Bank senior unsecured long-term debt ratings are collected from Bloomberg. Figure 1 presents the distribution of daily ratings of banks for each CRA. It is worth noting that none of the banks are rated at the triple-A rating category. This is consistent with the findings of Alsakka et al. (2014) that the European bank ratings are frequently constrained by the sovereign ceiling during the crisis period, and therefore the average bank ratings tend to be lower than the average sovereign ratings by 1 or 2 notches. Only 15% of banks ratings' observations were at speculative-grade rating (BB+/Ba1 or below) during the sample period. Moody's greater willingness to use downgrades of more than one-notch is notable.
Approximately a quarter of bank rating downgrades by S&P and Fitch are of more than onenotch, compared to 43% by Moody's. Almost all of the rating downgrade events are "clean"
i.e. are not followed by rating downgrade from other CRA(s) within at least 1 week. There are only 43 'unclean' rating events which involve more than one CRA taking rating downgrade action on the same bank within one week.
Methodology
Event study
We employ standard event study methodology to measure the reaction of bank share prices and volatility to bank rating downgrades. We examine changes in cumulative abnormal return (CAR), Buy-and-hold abnormal return ( Abnormal stock return (AR) is estimated using the market mode, as follows:
R t is the continuously compounded rate of return for stock i on day t. 
Stock volatility is captured by intraday range (Parkinson, 1980) which is measured by the logarithm of intraday high over intraday low prices. The intraday range is estimated as:
2 2 1  Prior research shows that the daily range is significantly more efficient than the realized volatility. Alizadeh et al. (2002) and Brandt and Diebold (2006) demonstrate that the rangebased volatility estimator appears robust to microstructure noise such as bid-ask bounce.
We conduct the tests in the event study on the pre-and post-July 2011 sub-samples. In order to avoid any possible bias due to the distribution of the sample means, we conduct both t-test and non-parametric tests. The non-parametric tests are sign-and Wilcoxon tests, testing whether the medians of CAR, BHAR and intraday high-low range during the time windows are significantly different to zero.
Multivariate analysis
The multivariate analysis aims to control for multiple factors that may affect banks' share prices and volatility, such as the levels of banks' creditworthiness, bank size, book-tomarket, bank characteristics or country characteristics (e.g. Shen et al., 2012; Hau et al., 2013) . The following Equations are estimated: ΔRating i,t is the daily change in the rating level of bank i at time t. D reg.change is a dummy variable for the regulatory change, taking the value of one when the regulatory regime has been established (i.e. post July 2011) and zero otherwise. We also include the interaction between ΔRating and D reg.change in order to disentangle any impact(s) of the new regulatory regime on the market participants' perceptions of CRAs' actions.
ΣX k is a set of control variables, including the current rating level of bank i, bank size (measured by the logarithm of total assets), book-to-market ratio, individual bank dummies and year dummies. The current rating level of the bank is included to control for the financial and fundamental conditions of the bank. In other words, this is to control for the likelihood that less healthy banks (i.e. lower credit ratings) tend to experience more volatile changes in the dependent variables, i.e. returns and volatility. The bank size and Book-to-market ratio are included as they could explain the variation in returns to some extent (Fama and French, 1992) . Bank dummies and year dummies are included to control for individual bank characteristics and the business cycle. The individual bank characteristics should mop up country specifics or country characteristics. The estimations of Equations (1), (2), and (3) are based on a sample of rating event days plus random bank-matched non-event days, drawn from the full sample excluding nonevent observations within one month before and after rating announcements. This is done in order to mitigate rating clustering and market noise issues (e.g. Ferreira & Gama, 2007 , Tran et al., 2014 . It is noteworthy that the sample consists of observations on non-consecutive days that may be very distant from each other. Therefore, estimations of the equations are not time series investigations. Tables 4-6 In contrast, in the post-July 2011 subsample, reactions to Fitch downgrades are no longer significant. This could be interpreted as indicating that the new regulation has been effective in its objective of dampening the market reactions to rating news. However, market responses to S&P and Moody's actions have also altered. S&P downgrades trigger a significant impact on CARs. The impact is only very short-term, i.e. during the day when rating news is released and no further significant reaction is found in the next days. The magnitude of the negative abnormal return is about 1.15 percentage points (see Table 4 ). On the other hand, Moody's downgrades induce longer lasting effects. The negative abnormal returns are reported up to one month after Moody's bank rating downgrades. On the day of rating announcements from Moody's, share values decrease by 0.6 percentage points and the reduction continues until one month later, and the magnitude of the reduction is also very large, i.e. over 5 percentage points (see Tables 4 and 5) . A possible explanation could arise from different adjustments in the three CRAs' policies in response to the regulation. Table 6 presents results for the intraday high-low range. The greater the high-low range, the higher is the stock price volatility. Overall, the findings of Table 6 This pattern of market reactions is unexpected. Negative rating news (i.e. rating downgrades) often triggers negative market reactions (Hand et al., 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Li et al., 2006; Halek and Eckles, 2010) . However, it is noteworthy that these papers examine assets' returns. Table 6 presents results on asset volatility which behaves differently to asset returns (e.g. Beber and Brandt, 2009). Tran et al. (2014) illustrate that additional rating news (even negative rating news) could play a "confirmation" role and reduce market volatility. In other words, share price volatility reduces in response to S&P downgrades, which was not revealed prior to the regulatory regime changes. The direct implication is that the regulatory changes might contribute to enhance the transparency in the rating procedure, therefore, promote market stability in the sense that share prices are less volatile in response to S&P downgrades. In summary, there is clear-cut evidence that there is a shift in market participants' perceptions of rating actions across CRAs around the time milestone of the new regulatory regime establishment. However, it is not obvious that the shift is due to the new regulatory regime establishment or simply due to relative changes in rating policies and downgrade leadership across the CRAs themselves. 
Empirical results
Event study
Multivariate analysis
Tables 7 to 9 present the results from the multivariate investigations (i.e. estimations of Equations (1), (2) and (3)). The main independent variables of interest are ΔRating (i.e. daily changes in rating levels) and ΔRating x D reg.change (i.e. the interaction between changes in rating levels and the regulatory change dummy). In the baseline models (i.e. Equations are insignificant in explaining the variability in CAR during most time windows. There is only one exception which is the interaction term during the [-1, 0] window, which indicates that reactions to S&P rating downgrades become more significant after the regulatory change in July 2011. S&P downgrades trigger significant negative abnormal returns of 0.9 5 We have also conducted equivalent investigations after excluding 43 "unclean events", described in Section 3. Results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar. percentage points after July 2011. The negative abnormal return is only very short-lived, i.e. on the same day when S&P downgrades are released. Table 7 In other words, after the regulatory change, S&P downgrades trigger short-lived negative BHAR. After the regulatory change, there is evidence of strengthened negative reactions to Moody's downgrades which is not short-lived. In contrast, the market impact of Fitch downgrades is weaker after the regulatory change, implying that the regulatory change has dampened negative reactions to Fitch downgrades. Table 9 reports the results for Eq. (3a) and Eq. (3b), which investigate the market impact of rating downgrades on the intraday high-low range. Panel A of Table 9 For the period before July 2011, Panel B of Table 9 shows that the banks' share price volatility is reduced by 0.8 percentage points within one month following Moody's downgrades. Yet, the regulatory change has altered the impact of Moody's rating downgrades, whereby they trigger modest increases in volatility after July 2011. Panel C of Table 9 demonstrates that Fitch bank downgrades have insignificant impact on share price volatility before and after the regulatory change.
Panel B of
In summary, there is clear evidence that there is a shift in market participants' perceptions of rating actions across CRAs around the time milestone of the new regulatory regime establishment. The only exception is the volatility impact of Fitch downgrades, which are not influential before nor after the regulatory change. In general, larger banks are associated with more negative abnormal return and lower volatility. Banks with higher ratings experience more negative abnormal return and increased volatility following bank rating downgrades. We also carry out several robustness checks for outlier or extreme values which produce qualitatively similar results (available upon request).
Conclusion
The primary focus of this paper is to investigate whether there is any identifiable difference in market perceptions of rating actions by Moody's, S&P and Fitch following the establishment of the new regulatory regime in July 2011 (i.e. ESMA taking over the ongoing regulatory oversight of CRAs operating in Europe). Using a sample of 44 publicly listed European banks which were part of the 2011 EU stress test, we examine the reactions of banks' stock returns and price volatility to bank rating actions by the three largest CRAs during January 2008 to December 2013. The sample period is characterised by a strong bank rating downgrade trend as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis. We focus our empirical investigation (event study and regression analysis) on banks' rating downgrades, given the very limited numbers of rating upgrades released by the CRAs for this sample.
The empirical findings present mixed evidence of a shift in market perceptions of CRAs' rating downgrades after the establishment of the new regulatory regime. Differentials in market reactions to different CRAs are identified. Firstly, S&P and Moody's rating downgrades trigger significant negative abnormal returns after July 2011, while these effects did not exist before July 2011. The negative abnormal return is only very short-lived following S&P actions. Secondly, the regulatory change has dampened the market response within one week/month following bank rating downgrades by Fitch. Third, S&P downgrades trigger short-lived increases in share price volatility prior to regulatory change, while after the regulatory change the share price volatility reduces following S&P actions. In the period prior to July 2011, Moody's downgrades reduce the banks' share price volatility, while they trigger modest increases in the volatility after July 2011. Finally, the regulatory change did not alter the insignificant impact of Fitch rating downgrades on banks' share price volatility. Overall, there is mixed evidence on whether the new regulatory regime has succeeded in dampening market reactions to rating news or promoted market stability. The shift in market perceptions of CRA downgrades could be due to either the new regulatory regime or changes in rating policies across CRAs.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the effect of the new regulatory regime (i.e. ESMA's responsibility for CRAs) on the market reactions to credit rating actions, and therefore policy makers in the EU and ESMA should be particularly interested in these empirical findings. The paper is also relevant to fund managers and other investors, especially those who focus on international diversification and who follow passive investment strategies. This paper considers multiple CRAs in a competitive setting and studies differences in their rating opinions, and hence CRAs will also be interested from a reputational perspective. Further, the investigation of volatility reactions is particularly relevant to the widespread desire for market stability. This table reports numbers of rating downgrades released by the CRAs on the sampled banks (see Table 2 ) during January 2008 -December 2013. July 2011 is the regulatory-change date, whereby ESMA was assigned with direct supervision of CRAs in the EU. There are limited numbers of rating upgrades released by the CRAs on the sampled banks (i.e. 5 by S&P, 4 by Moody's and 8 by Fitch) making empirical investigation of rating upgrades infeasible. [-250,-50] . Bold figures denote significant in both t-test and non-parametric tests. † denotes significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. [-1,0] window captures abnormal returns in day 0. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. Abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model using a rolling window of [-250, -50] . Bold figures denote significant in both t-test and non-parametric tests. † denotes significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. This table presents the results of the event study on cumulative changes in the intraday high-low range. The range utilizes intraday high and low prices using Parkinson (1980) . Row 'Mean' reports average cumulative changes in the range during the time windows in percentage points. Rows 't-test', 'signtest', 'Wilcoxon' report p-values from the respective tests. Bold figures denote significant in both t-test and non-parametric tests. † denotes significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. (1a) and (1b). The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used for ease of interpretation. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bank-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies and year dummies are included but not reported for sake of presentation. (2a) and (2b). The dependent variable is Buyand-Hold abnormal returns during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used for ease of interpretation. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bank-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See Tables 2 and  3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies and year dummies are included but not reported for sake of presentation. (3a) and (3b). The dependent variable is cumulative changes in the intraday high-low range during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used for ease of interpretation. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bankmatched random sampling from the full sample is used. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies and year dummies are included but not reported for sake of presentation. 
